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PANEL I:  
PROFESSOR BRODLEY’S GENERAL 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ANTITRUST 
SCHOLARSHIP 
INTRODUCTION 
KEITH N. HYLTON∗ 
When I began teaching Antitrust, I was the junior colleague of a more senior 
antitrust scholar, teaching the course on opposite semesters to the relatively 
few students who were forced by scheduling conflicts to take the course with 
me as their teacher.  After my senior colleague departed for another school – 
and after the departure of some other senior Law and Economics colleagues – I 
was for a brief period the senior antitrust scholar at the institution, and this was 
in only my fifth year of teaching law.  Boston University soon approached me 
and my wife with the offer of appointments, and we decided to accept.  I would 
again become the junior colleague of a more senior antitrust professor, this 
time Joe Brodley.  Of course, I knew who Joe Brodley was, and the notion of 
quitting a post as the senior antitrust professor at a relatively highly ranked 
school to become the junior antitrust colleague to Joe Brodley struck me as 
uncontroversial.  In today’s status-obsessed market, such a move would strike 
junior professors as indefensible.  But in those days, most scholars seemed 
focused less on rankings and more on the quality of work done by individuals 
– at least that was my perception then, however wrong it may have been.  Joe 
had been a famous antitrust scholar for some time when I moved to Boston 
University, and I viewed the combination of myself as the junior scholar and 
Joe as the senior one as a potentially good antitrust faculty – if I could live up 
to my end of the bargain. 
Joe and I have different preferences on antitrust issues.  He prefers vigorous 
antitrust enforcement.  Not long after I arrived here, I joked with a colleague 
that there appear to be few if any antitrust prosecutions that Joe would find ill-
advised – obviously an unfair comment, but a quick way of getting across my 
sense of his policy reflexes.  I have always been more cautious, to the point of 
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being listed by one website as an “antitrust skeptic.”1  The differences have 
less to do, I think, with our views on the competence of enforcers than with our 
assessment of the market itself.  Joe is deeply skeptical of the market’s power 
to correct inefficiencies due to anticompetitive conduct.  My prior beliefs have 
been more favorable toward unregulated markets. 
Though it was not a reason for my move to Boston University, I thought this 
difference in views would be good for my own development as a scholar and 
good for the students at Boston University.  I joked with colleagues that the 
students could take the anti-trust version of antitrust from Joe or the pro-trust 
version of antitrust from me.  The large class sizes at Boston University at the 
time meant that the course could be offered both semesters with sizeable 
enrollments. 
My thoughts about moving to Boston University to become the junior 
antitrust colleague to Joe Brodley reflected several aspects of antitrust 
scholarship and teaching that were relatively unusual in the legal academy, and 
are perhaps becoming more so.  In antitrust, unlike many other areas of legal 
scholarship today, ideological differences do not tend to cause unbridgeable 
barriers between scholars.  This is due in part to the contributions of scholars 
such as Joe Brodley. 
Antitrust scholarship today reflects the full range of approaches seen in the 
Law and Economics literature: doctrinal, theoretical, and empirical.  The 
doctrinal work consists of the most traditional type of legal scholarship: 
examining important court opinions, trying to understand what they mean, and 
seeking to reconcile them with earlier opinions.  The doctrinal work is still the 
main type of scholarship produced in law schools.  The theoretical work in 
antitrust consists largely of economic modeling of the effects of 
anticompetitive strategies or of antitrust law itself.  The empirical work in 
antitrust consists of traditional empirical studies in industrial organization and 
more recent projects that attempt to measure the restrictiveness of antitrust 
laws and estimate their impact. 
For a scholar outside of law, doctrinal scholarship is easy to recognize, and 
easily recognized as differing from most other types of research.  The papers 
tend to be long and full of footnotes, and consist of case discussions tied 
together with an extremely general or vague thesis.  The argument is more 
concerned with the consistency of the case law rules than with any sense of an 
external standard of evaluation. 
In its early days, antitrust was no different from general legal scholarship.  
Although economists have written about antitrust issues for a long time, legal 
scholars have not always felt a need to pay close attention to what the 
economists said.  Legal scholars remained safely within their own academies 
to focus on doctrinal consistency or the consistency of the doctrine with some 
 
1 Clyde Wayne Crews, Antitrust Skeptic’s Bibliography, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Apr. 
13, 2006), http://cei.org/gencon/030,05269.cfm (providing a reading list of articles that offer 
a skeptical view of the desirability of expansive antitrust enforcement).  
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factional interest – such as protection of consumer interests or protection of 
business incentives. 
The useful external standards in antitrust have been introduced into the 
literature by economists.  Indeed, one interesting feature of antitrust 
scholarship is that there are a large number of law review and economics 
journal articles on antitrust written by academic economists in the 1950s and 
1960s.  These articles were written back in the days when economics 
departments had many professors who did not use mathematical models.  Their 
articles looked like those of law professors, though without as many footnotes 
and with a reliance on an external standard by which to judge the antitrust 
cases.  Very few economics professors of this sort are in existence today.  The 
mathematical modeling requirements of their discipline have led economics 
professors to invest their intellectual capital in the activity of modeling, which 
has left little time for them to study the law, as many economists of a previous 
generation did.  
The external standards that economists have introduced to antitrust are total 
welfare, efficiency, and consumer welfare in the long run.  I refer to long-run 
consumer welfare because that standard allows an analyst to consider at least 
some of the efficiency effects of any legal standard.  Short-run consumer 
welfare, on the other hand, is indistinguishable from a factional interest 
standard of the sort that law professors have typically used.  I think most 
economists, when pressed on the issue, would reject an exclusive focus on 
short-run consumer welfare.  An economist who believes in an exclusive focus 
on the welfare of the consumer would have to favor an antitrust enforcement 
rule that forgoes one thousand dollars in efficiency gains to squeeze out one 
penny more in consumer surplus.  I think there are few economists who would 
favor such a tradeoff. 
At some point between 1960 and 1970, antitrust scholarship from the law 
side changed, as did antitrust scholarship from the economics side, though the 
changes occurred for different reasons.  Law professors began to adopt the 
external standards introduced by economists.  Richard Posner is the most 
famous example of a law professor who promoted the use of economic 
reasoning in law scholarship.  However, other scholars also played a role in 
introducing economic reasoning in antitrust.  One of them was Joe Brodley.  
His 1967 article on oligopoly power reflected one of the early efforts by legal 
scholars to integrate economic analysis with antitrust law scholarship.2  
Although it was not cited in the more famous Posner piece on the same 
subject,3 it presumably had some influence. 
 
2 Joseph F. Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts – From 
Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REV. 285 (1967). 
3 Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. 
L. REV. 1562 (1969).  Both the Brodley and Posner articles respond to arguments in Donald 
F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and 
  
1370 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1367 
 
Joe Brodley was by no means the first law scholar to merge economics into 
the discussion of antitrust law.  He was preceded by others including, for 
example, James Rahl at Northwestern University, Eugene Rostow at Yale 
University, and Aaron Director at the University of Chicago.4  However, the 
earlier writing on economics and antitrust by law academics (although Director 
was an economist by training) is not representative of the wave of Law and 
Economics scholarship in antitrust that later appeared.   
For example, one observes in Rahl’s work an effort to explain to economists 
the limits the law puts on the usefulness of economic analysis in antitrust.5  
Law has its own cumbersome machinery, which serves important purposes.  
One of the key points of Rahl’s article on conscious parallelism, which was the 
first to identify the controversial issues parallel conduct raises under the 
Sherman Act, was that courts cannot always adopt the recommendations of 
economists without risking erroneous results from clumsy application of 
economic concepts or doing damage to the law itself.6 
Similarly, Rostow’s work on The New Sherman Act was an effort to explain 
that courts were going in a direction that economists such as Edward 
Chamberlin would prefer.7  It was, in contrast to Rahl, an effort to make the 
law shape itself around the normative implications of economics, rather than 
an effort to show economists how the law could not always bend toward their 
preferences. 
Director and Levi’s work represents the most effective and famous 
integration of economics and law, though much of it took place in the 
classroom.  Their classic article, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, sets 
out the Chicago School analysis of antitrust.8  At the time, however, their 
article had a greater influence within the Chicago Law School than outside of 
it.  As a result, the first generation of Law and Economics scholarship in 
antitrust would not appear until a decade after the Director and Levi article. 
 
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).  See Brodley, supra note 2, at 295 n.7; 
Posner, supra, at 1562. 
4 Obviously, this list is not complete.  Ward Bowman, of Yale University, preceded 
Brodley.  Bowman was trained as an economist and focused on criticizing the leverage 
theory adopted by antitrust courts in the 1950s.  For an example of Bowman’s work, see 
Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 
(1957).  Robert Bork, also of Yale, preceded Brodley by just a few years, and should 
therefore be viewed as a contemporary of Brodley. 
5 See, e.g., James A. Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REV. 743, 768 
(1950). 
6 Id. at 762. 
7 Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 567, 567 (1947); id. at 567 n.I (citing Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition (5th ed. 1946)). 
8 Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 NW. U. 
L. REV. 281, 282 (1956). 
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Joe Brodley is one among the first generation of legal scholars, including 
Posner, to carry out a sustained public campaign (in contrast to the private 
tradition of Director) to integrate economic analysis with legal reasoning, and 
this effort has been central to his work throughout his career.  Perhaps the best 
example is his last major antitrust article, on predation, coauthored with Patrick 
Bolton and Michael Riordan.9  The article is widely and justly recognized as a 
classic on predatory pricing law. 
As I mentioned, I do not agree with Joe on every issue in antitrust.  The 
predation article, though I am the first to say it is a classic, is an example of 
one of our disagreements.  Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan use the game-
theoretic “Post-Chicago” literature on predation to generate practical legal tests 
for courts to apply in predation antitrust cases.  This is an extremely valuable 
contribution to the literature, and is precisely the goal of interdisciplinary 
scholarship in law and economics.  The article implies that the Supreme Court 
was wrong in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.10 
when it set up a legal standard that makes it almost impossible for a predation 
plaintiff to prevail.11  Its practical and theoretically rigorous analysis is a 
powerful indictment of many of the arguments supporting the Brooke Group 
standard. 
But I believe the approach reflected in Bolton, Brodley, and Riordan 
ultimately gives short shrift to the problem of error costs, which is the core 
rationale for the Court’s decision in Brooke Group.  Given the risk of error, 
legal tests that make it easier for plaintiffs to prevail in predation lawsuits 
threaten to impose punishment on firms that have engaged in pro-competitive 
price cutting.  I think there is at least one additional step that needs to take 
place in the Post-Chicago economic analysis of antitrust, and that is to 
incorporate the risk of judicial error and the costliness of litigation into models 
of anticompetitive conduct in the presence of antitrust litigation.  A paper by 
Dag Morten Dalen and Theon van Dijk shows, within a game-theoretic model, 
the comedy of errors (or more appropriately, tragedy of errors) that results 
when courts apply the more aggressive predation enforcement approach that 
exists now in the European Union.12  The Dalen-van Dijk paper examines the 
effects of a predation rule that finds the dominant firm liable for predation 
when price is below incremental cost.  The paper shows that the predation law 
discourages competition if damages are sufficiently high and weakens 
competition in all cases.  Moreover, their model delivers a counterintuitive 
“you bought the cow so you may as well get the milk” finding that the law, 
 
9 See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: 
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000).  
10 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
11 Id. at 226. 
12 Dag Morten Dalen & Theon van Dijk, Imperfect Enforcement of Predatory Pricing 
Law (Mar. 24, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1341804.   
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enforced with error, encourages predation in some cases because the pricing of 
all firms is distorted by the threat of litigation. 
In any event, disagreement on specific policies, such as the law on 
predation, is a bit easier to deal with in antitrust than in many other areas of 
legal scholarship because there is broad methodological agreement.  Antitrust 
scholars from the law side and from the economics side all adhere to the same 
framework, which adopts economic analysis in search of an objective external 
standard by which to judge antitrust cases and statutes.  The search for, and use 
of, such a standard requires a great deal of study.  The exercise of modeling in 
antitrust scholarship has had the same effect as in economics generally.  It has 
forced scholars to be clear about their premises and the connection between 
those premises and their arguments.  It has forced scholars to attempt to make 
rigorous arguments.  The use of economic models has constrained 
argumentation and led both sides to recognize the elements of truth in the 
position taken by the other side. 
This practice is one reason why I think there is a great deal of respect within 
antitrust among scholars who have opposing views on the law, certainly more 
than one could ever observe in areas such as constitutional law scholarship.  
Antitrust law has been made rigorous through the widespread acceptance of an 
objective framework based on economic analysis.  Constitutional law, as a 
field of scholarship, has never achieved the same rigor by the general 
acceptance of an objective, in contrast to factional-interest centered, 
framework of analysis. 
Antitrust scholars today are fortunate to work in a field in which there is a 
commonly accepted vision of normal science and progress in understanding.  
Joe Brodley, as one of a small number of scholars who played a pivotal role in 
integrating economics and antitrust scholarship, thereby determining the course 
of modern antitrust scholarship, deserves a share of the credit for this 
development. 
The purpose of this conference is to thank Joe Brodley for his contributions 
to antitrust scholarship.  The contributors to this conference are among the 
most accomplished antitrust scholars today, and this is, if anything, an 
understatement.  The conference papers have been contributed to three panels, 
moving from backward-looking to forward-looking.  The scholars on the first 
panel chose to write their reflections largely on Joe Brodley’s scholarship and 
its influence on their own work.  The second panel of papers examines topics 
that Joe Brodley wrote about: predatory pricing, joint ventures, mergers, 
oligopoly, and the goals of antitrust law.  The final panel, looking to the future, 
examines the normative question of what antitrust policy should attempt to do 
in the new presidential administration, which has announced plans to reject the 
monopolization law enforcement policies announced in 2008 by the previous 
administration.13 
 
13 Compare U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM 
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008), available at 
  
2010] INTRODUCTION: BRODLEY CONFERENCE 1373 
 
The topic of the final panel is one that Joe suggested as the sole topic for 
this conference, after I told him that a conference in his honor was in the 
works.  It is characteristic of his humility and focus on current problems that he 
would be reluctant, even standing at the threshold of retirement, to consider a 
conference in his honor.  Unsurprisingly, I had no trouble finding great 
antitrust scholars who did not share that reluctance.   
 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm, with Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm. 
